Google Nexus Had to Die So Pixel Could Live (Premium)

A new interview with the person who runs Google’s hardware efforts casts some light on why the Nexus lineup had to die.

As you may know, Google for years sold third-party devices under the Nexus brand. The idea was to provide consumers with a clean Google experience that was untainted by hardware maker customizations and included access to the latest Android features.

The Nexus products were a bit like the classic Star Trek movies: Some of them—both Nexus 7 tablets, the Nexus 5, and the Nexus 5X and 6P—were excellent, but some—most notably the Nexus 6—were duds. Worse, Google played around with pricing a bit too much. Some Nexus devices, most notably the Nexus 5X and 6P, were great values, as they offered flagship specifications for hundreds less than the competition. But some were just stupid expensive for what you go. Like, again, the Nexus 6.

In any event, Google in 2016 announced that it would, “for the first time,” sell its own phones under the Pixel brand. This was a lie, and that is true on a number of levels. But the tech media, being the dupes that they are, ate it up as always. We’ve been treated to “Google is finally serious about taking on the iPhone” stories for years.

The notion that Google was doing something different here has always bothered me. First, Google has, in fact, sold its own phones before: Google owned Motorola from 2012 through 2014.

Worse, Pixel isn’t all that different from Nexus. Google doesn’t “make” Pixel phones. Like Nexus, it relies on third-party hardware partners like HTC, LG, and (depending on the year) others to do so. Google does design the devices, as it did with Nexus. The big difference is that Google has more say over what goes into the devices. That said, we still see the companies that are responsible for each Pixel have released their own versions of those phones too. So it seems like a subtle distinction to me. More marketing than reality.

But a Wired interview with Rick Osterloh, who runs Google’s hardware division, sheds some light on why Pixel needed to happen. And, more important, why Nexus needed to die.

According to Osterloh, the partners that created the Nexus devices for Google were secretly working to undermine them, too.

“Last year, [HTC] helped us build Pixel,” Osterloh says. “And then a few months later, they shipped the U11, and that phone had the best smartphone camera in the industry.”

In other words, Google’s partners would let Google ship a Nexus device with whatever specifications. And then shortly after, those companies would ship their own version of the same device, but with better features. Google was being betrayed by its own partners.

Osterloh had come to Google originally with Motorola, and he was preparing to leave the company when a conversation with CEO Sundar Pichai made him realize that, yes, Google really was getting serious about competing with the iPhone (again). The firm was looking to start a hardware group so it could gain more control over the phones it sold (and promote Google Assistant more broadly via a spectrum of devices). Pichai convinced Osterloh to stay, and to lead these efforts.

For the phones, this meant changing brands, from Nexus to Pixel, to signal to the world that things were different. But it also meant that Google now has more control over the phone’s innards. The result is a growing set of AI innovations, not just in Pixel, but across all of Google’s hardware. Google, like Apple and Microsoft, is taking Alan Kay’s most famous quip—“People who are really serious about software should make their own hardware”—to heart.

So let’s review.

With Nexus, Google would partner a third-party hardware maker to bring a handset to market. That handset would be designed by Google, but would essentially be the work of the partner, who was free to release their own version of the device. Often with improved specifications.

With Pixel, Google has to date still partnered with third-party hardware makers on each handset. That handset is designed by Google inside and out, and it is more of a collaboration that was the case in the past. The partner is still free to sell their own version of the device, but it will be different in some key areas. (For the Pixel 2 XL, for example, its Pixel Visual Core technology was a key differentiator. But now, Google is licensing this to its partners too.)

Going forward, however, things are going to change. (Meaning that, yes, we will soon be flooded with a new generation of “Google is finally getting serious about competing with iPhone” stories from the usual crowd.) Its recent acquisition of 2,000 key HTC employees—and its decision to bring Nest in-house—suggests that next-generation Nexus phones—-perhaps those that are released this fall—will be “real” Google products and that outside help will no longer be required.

Ultimately, I stand by my original assertion that the current two generations of Pixels are not meaningfully different from Nexus. But what this interview shows, I think, is that Google is moving to change that. And that is very good news indeed.

That said, Osterloh has a tough road ahead. His 2017 Pixels, especially the Pixel 2 XL, were incredibly buggy and didn’t reach the same quality levels we see from Samsung and Apple. This is particularly problematic because Google priced these lackluster devices in the same stratosphere as truly competitive flagships. I still feel very strongly that this is a huge strategic mistake. And that a company that managed to attract just .26 percent of the market in 2017 needs to be a lot more aggressive on pricing, as it was in the Nexus days (at least some of the time).

At least we now know why Nexus died. Let’s just hope it didn’t die in vain.

PS: The Wired interview with Rick Osterloh is excellent, and you should read it regardless of your opinions about this write-up or the topic.